Exploitable vulnerabilities, are often, an outcome of semantic bugs in a program's software implementation. Since analyzing large codebases for detecting semantic bugs is hard, there is a reliance on software testing for uncovering defects. Compiler-driven program analyzers such as the Clang Static Analyzer are promising, but a local outlook limits their potential.
Introduction
Finding semantic bugs in large and constantly evolving codebases is challenging. Software testing (unit-tests, fuzzing etc.) is effective at uncovering bugs, and remains to be used in production environments. However, for large programs, the state space of program inputs is too vast to have a reasonable assurance that testing uncovered a majority of program paths.
Program analysis offers a complementary approach for bug discovery. Ever since Lint was written in the late 70s, technical advances together with increased availability of computational power have made semantic (deep) program analysis possible. In contrast to syntactic (shallow) analysis, deep program analysis attempts to capture the semantics of a program short of running the program with concrete inputs.
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When employed for bug finding, deep program analysis merits several practical considerations. First, analysis needs to be precise (minimize warning fatigue), while scaling up to large programs. Second, analysis needs to have a global view of the program. Compile-time analysis is necessary but not sufficient for finding defects in object-oriented code, due in part, to design patterns such as encapsulation, and dynamic language features such as polymorphism. Third, program analysis is useful when it helps in fixing bugs; simply finding bugs has little utility. Thus, providing bug diagnostics is essential. Finally, code abstraction at which analysis is carried out, and the nature of the analysis itself-static vs. dynamic-influence the ease of carrying out certain kinds of analyses. These considerations have guided the design of semantic program analyzers such as KLEE, MAYHEM, and the Clang Static Analyzer to name a few [15, 16, 2] .
Against this backdrop, this paper explores a novel design point. We propose an extended compile-time analysis framework, Mélange, that analyses a codebase in a staged manner. The main intuition behind Mélange is that, when faced with partial manifestation of a potential bug, we can do better than being conservative. We write a Checker-a compiler plug-in for semantic analysis-to discover Candidate bugs in source code. This forms the first stage of our analysis. Candidate bug reports encode circumstances surrounding a candidate bug, such as, the local program path in which it occurred, buggy program variable etc.
We generate LLVM Bitcode (Intermediate Representation, IR) and use it as analysis target for whole-program analysis. This forms the second and final stage of our analysis. Whole-program analysis is demand-driven: Inputs from candidate bug reports are used to drive the analysis. We write an LLVM Pass-analysis procedure for LLVM bitcode-to perform the analysis. The Pass either invalidates a candidate bug report, or, presents a whole-program callchain in which the bug is potentially valid. Since whole-program analysis is query-driven, it scales up to large program binaries and/or libraries. Mélange's biggest evaluation target (by size) has been Firefox's libxul library (1.1 GB) that encapsulates the Gecko browser back-end.
Mélange is not the first proposal to attempt mixed-level analysis. AEG [13] performs both source-level and binary analysis towards generating exploits for a target program. However, compile-time analysis is a precursor to AEG's dynamic program analysis that is required for exploit reconnaissance and generation. In contrast, Mélange is an entirely static analysis framework that sidesteps the problem of proving exploitability of uncovered defects. Mélange's main goal is early discovery of potentially exploitable software defects in codebases under active development.
The main strength of our proposal is that it allows for heuristics-based analysis to be applied to entire codebases in mining for instances of a known defect type. However, our approach has limitations. For scaling out to multiple defect types, we rely on developer-supplied analysis procedures at two code abstractions: a Checker for source-level analysis, and an LLVM Pass for whole-program analysis. The prototype of Mélange for flagging uninitialized reads is compact- We hope our findings motivate developers to leverage our framework, while using existing analysis infrastructure, to discover other types of defects.
In summary, we make the following contributions.
1. We present the design and implementation of a staged program analysis framework, that we call Mélange. Mélange scales up to large codebases and lends itself well to heuristics based analysis.
2. We make use of existing infrastructure in the LLVM project to prototype Mélange for finding a class of memory access bugs.
3. We evaluate the prototype against three large codebases, namely Chromium, Firefox, and MySQL, assessing its effectiveness in finding bugs and its analysis overhead. In addition, we benchmark it against NIST's SAMATE test suite for program analysis tools.
Approach Overview
Our primary goal is to develop an early warning system for security-critical software defects. We approach this goal from the vantage point of a static program analyzer. We seek to develop a tool that assists a developer in identifying, and, fixing potential defects in large object-oriented codebases. Defects that we find may or may not be exploitable. Proving exploitability and/or generating exploits for an uncovered software defect-an end-goal of frameworks such as AEG [13] , and MAYHEM [16] -is beyond our scope. A proof of exploitability requires knowledge of not only the operational semantics of a program abstraction, but also of run-time semantics of a program. A static program analyzer, such as ours, is aware of the former but not the latter.
The fundamental challenge faced by static bug detection tools is to capture program semantics short of executing the program. In particular, we encounter the following problems:
• Narrow analysis outlook impedes analysis. While intra translation unit analysis is inherently parallel and scales up to large codebases, it misses even simple bugs that span source files.
• Object Oriented Programming (OOP) languages are developer-friendly but analysis-hostile. OOP concepts such as encapsulation, and its features such as polymorphism, diminish the utility of local (intra translation unit) analysis.
• High false-positive/negative rates, and intractable analyses, detract from the appeal of static analysis. To keep false-positive/negative rate low, analysis needs to be precise and have a global outlook. In addition, analysis of large programs should be tractable.
We leverage existing analysis infrastructure in the LLVM project [9] . We prototype Mélange for finding uninitialized reads [5] in object-oriented code. Existing program analysis tools for detecting uninitialized reads [3, 2, 4] either have low precision, or have a narrow analysis outlook. In contrast, our analysis has high precision during defect discovery, and scales up to the entire program during defect extrapolation. Figure 1 provides an overview of our approach. Mélange uses an existing build interceptor for decoupling code analysis from code generation. Analysis and compilation are performed in distinct processes. Code is generated for two targets. The native compiler generates code for the target architecture, while the LLVM builder generates LLVM bitcode (IR). LLVM bitcode serves as our analysis target for whole-program (IR-level) analysis. Our analysis is structured into two stages: Defect discovery, and defect extrapolation. Defects are discovered during source-level analysis. Discovered defects are scrutinized during IR-level analysis.
Defect Discovery We implement a Checker that plugs into a patched version of the Clang Static Analyzer (Clang SA). The checker performs inter-procedural, and path, and context sensitive analysis. We leverage forward symbolic execution that is carried out by Clang SA's data-flow analysis engine towards finding reaching definitions for C++ class member uses. However, we supplement Clang SA's native analysis abstraction with a new abstraction that is based on taintedness of C++ objects. Our abstraction enables our analysis to sidestep constraints imposed on symbolic execution by heavily object-oriented code (see § 4). Additionally, we patch support for procedure summaries in Clang SA. Procedure summaries enable analysis across analysis contexts. Our additions to Clang SA have been implemented in 208 lines of code, and the checker itself in 364 lines of code.
Defect Extrapolation
We perform whole-program analysis against queries generated from source-level bug reports. The analysis is implemented as an LLVM pass in 355 lines of C++ code. The analysis backtracks from the program point at which a bug manifested, attempting to explore program callchains in which there are no reaching definitions for a use of a class member. Our IR analyzer reports whole-program callchains in which a reaching definition does exist. Our defect extrapolation algorithm is inter-procedural, but path, and context insensitive. Therefore, it provides Maybe answers to queries made. We defer discussion of approximations that our extrapolation algorithm makes to Section 6.1. The LLVM infrastructure project [9] was pioneered by Lattner et al. [27] . Clang/LLVM is an open-source compiler toolchain that is an integral part of the project. The LLVM project is a strong proponent of code modularity and reuse. Different parts of the compiler front-end (Clang) and back-end (LLVM) are encapsulated into libraries that can be selectively used by client systems depending on their needs. Thus, the project lends itself well to multiple compilertechnology-driven use-cases, program analysis being one of them. We review Clang/LLVM's source and IR-level analysis infrastructure in the following paragraphs.
Source-level Analysis Source-level analysis infrastructure is part of Clangthe LLVM front-end for C, C++, and Objective-C languages. The analysis infrastructure comprises of Clang Static Analyzer (Clang SA) [2] . The primary motivation behind Clang SA is to be able to find as many bugs in program code as early as possible using deep analysis of source code.
Clang SA is a meta-compilation framework similar in spirit to xgcc [21] . The goal of a meta-compilation framework is to allow for modular extensions to the compiler that enable checking of semantic program properties. The division of labor envisioned in [21] is that Checkers-domain-specific analysis proceduresonly encode the property to check, leaving the mechanics of the actual checking to the compilation system. The compilation system facilitates checking by providing the necessary analysis infrastructure e.g., data-flow analysis engine. In the Clang project, the Clang SA core library provides the analysis infrastructure. The core library implements an iterative Data-Flow Analysis (DFA) engine that is both path and context sensitive. The DFA engine employs static Forward Symbolic Execution (FSE) [32] for program analysis.
The Clang project, with its library-based architecture, lends itself particularly well for implementing a meta-compilation framework. In particular, the producer-consumer design pattern [19] , a recurring theme in Clang, neatly separates production of parser internal data structures such as Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) and Control Flow Graph (CFG) from their consumption. This means code compilation (generation) and code analysis can happen in two largely independent consumers. Thus, Clang SA-the Analysis Consumer -can be independently invoked on source-code.
IR-level Analysis IR-level analysis infrastructure is part of LLVM codebase.
Analysis is performed in a Pass that runs on LLVM bitcode or assembly file. Simply put, a Pass is an operation (procedure invocation) on a unit of IR code. The LLVM Pass framework [12] allows for transformation and/or analysis of code at different granularities (e.g., Function, Module etc.). Passes may be run in sequence, allowing a successive Pass to reuse information from (or work on a transformation carried out by) preceding Passes.
LLVM provides APIs to tap into source-level meta-data in LLVM IR. This provides a means to bridge the syntactic gap between source-level and IR-level analyses. Source literals may be matched against LLVM IR meta-data programmatically. Mélange takes this approach to teach the LLVM pass what a source-level bug report means. Figure 2 provides an overview of the Clang Static Analyzer. Seen as a black box, Clang SA takes source code as input and emits bug reports with source-level diagnostics as output. Clang SA depends on parser internal program meta-data to perform semantic program analysis. It consumes the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST T U in Figure 2 ) representation of a source file which is generated by the Clang front-end. A Call Graph (CG F in Figure 2 ) is then constructed for the Translation Unit (TU in Figure 2 ). The CG (of a source file) is the basis for Clang SA's procedure visitation logic. Analysis is performed on one procedure at a time. Clang SA uses procedure-inlining to analyze callee procedures; this transforms inter-procedural context-sensitive data-flow analysis to an intra-procedural flow-sensitive data-flow analysis problem. Semantic program analysis takes place in Clang SA's path and context sensitive iterative Data-Flow Analysis (DFA) engine, described next.
Clang SA

Data-flow Analysis Engine
The Data-Flow Analysis (DFA) engine is by far Clang SA's most important sub-system. It implements a Graph Reachability engine [31] , symbolically executes procedures, drives Checkers, and maintains state required for analysis. Program paths created by Branch statements are independently explored (path sensitivity). In addition, analysis preserves callreturn semantics of procedure invocations (context sensitivity).
The CFG of a procedure is the basis for analysis. Program statements in the analyzed procedure are symbolically executed. Clang SA tracks the state of analysis in a state machine (Program State) that Checkers can read from or append to. The DFA engine in Clang SA drives an expression evaluation engine. The evaluation engine encodes operational rules (semantics) of a programming language as transfer functions. The transfer functions evaluate a program statement (CFG Element) at a program point (Program Point) to a symbolic value. Clang SA has expression evaluation engines for C,C++, and Objective C programming languages.
The DFA engine exposes hooks so that Checkers may perform expression evaluation for their own end. The hooks are implemented using a visitor pattern i.e., Checkers register for statement types that they are interested in processing. Clang SA hands over control to Checkers when a program statement of the type they have registered for is being symbolically executed.
Checkers Checkers are analysis procedures that implement custom checks on source code and output bug reports if any. Clang SA contains a default suite of checkers that implement different kinds of checks. The default suite implements checks for flagging unsafe API usage, dead code, memory access errors etc. In addition, Clang SA checker APIs can be used by system implementors to develop domain-specific checkers. On analysis completion, bug reports for the analyzed source file (BR T U ) are emitted. Bug reports contain source-level diagnostics including description of the check that was violated and the program path in which the bug manifested. Clang SA and its checkers seen as a unit, demonstrate the power of deep program analysis that can be carried out at the source-level. While path-sensitive symbolic execution greatly boosts analysis precision, access to a rich AST allows for good bug diagnostics.
In summary, the Clang/LLVM project provides analysis infrastructure that is useful in building extensible bug finding tools. In the next section, we describe Mélange and how it leverages this analysis infrastructure.
Mélange
Object-oriented programming makes static program analysis difficult on many counts. Concepts such as encapsulation complicate analysis: Object implementations need to be analyzed taking into account object use in different scenarios. Consolidating analysis results from different portions of the program is a key requirement for analyzing object-oriented code. This precludes entirely compile-time analysis.
Mélange complements compile-time analysis with post link-time whole-program analysis. It comprises of four high-level components: a build interceptor, a whole program LLVM builder, and source-level and IR-level analyzers (see Figure 1 ). The build interceptor is a transparent deputy that independently invokes the compiler and the analyzer. Clang Static Analyzer's scan-build tool [2] is the basis for build interception in Mélange. We use Whole-program LLVM [11] -an open-source whole program LLVM (bitcode) builder-as our compiler. WLLVM is designed to be a drop-in replacement for a native compiler. It compiles LLVM bitcode independently of native code compilation.
Analysis procedures have been implemented as patches to Clang SA, and modular plug-ins to the Clang/LLVM analysis infrastructure. Staggered program analysis across code abstractions poses a problem. Source-level bug reports encode bug meta-data in source-level terms. However, in the program IR, source-level terms are either mangled or part of the program's debug meta-data. We take a two-pronged approach to facilitate analysis across code abstractions. In our Checker, we mangle function names of interest before emitting a bug report. The mangled function names serve as a direct input to the LLVM pass. Second, we make use of standard LLVM APIs to access named debug metadata in program IR. This permits us to match source-level terms against their counterparts in program IR.
Data-flow analysis in Clang SA is closely tied to static Forward Symbolic Execution (FSE) of program code. Although FSE models operational semantics of a high-level programming language, it cannot reason about meta semantics such as encapsulation. We propose an analysis technique called Declaration Tainting, that allows the analyzer to take up the task of interpreting meta program semantics on its own terms. Orthogonally, we develop a means to store context-sensitive Procedure Summaries in Clang SA. This enables our source-level analyzer to work across analysis contexts. We have implemented these extensions as patches to Clang Static Analyzer (Clang SA) core library. In the next section, we describe shortcomings of FSE in practice. Subsequently, we describe our patches to Clang SA ( § § 4.2-4.3).
Clang SA: Forward Symbolic Execution
Schwarz et al. [32] , describe challenges that FSE presents for program analysis. They do so by encoding operational semantics of FSE for the Simple Intermediate Language (SIMPIL). FSE, as it is carried out in Clang SA, shares the broad concerns highlighted in [32] , namely:
• Symbolic (user input dependent) memory addresses hinder analysis.
• Analysis may have to cope with side-effects of library calls.
• Analysis can get stuck in the presence of loops, and/or when the number of program paths to explore is very high.
In the case of Clang SA, some of these concerns are more pressing than others. Unlike systems like KLEE that perform symbolic execution of the whole program, Clang SA restricts execution scope to a source file. Thus, path explosion is not as severe a problem for Clang SA as it is for whole-program SE engines such as KLEE. Moreover, Clang SA takes a hard-headed approach to iterative data-flow analysis: Analysis times out on iteration reaching a pre-defined threshold. A large number of loops and branches may impede analysis coverage but not analysis itself. The other two concerns merit more consideration. Modeling side effects of library calls is important. In Listing 1, memset is actually an initialization routine for integer arrays. If analysis fails to model the side-effect (array initialization) of memset, it is going to incorrectly flag the assignment on Line 4 as an uninitialized read. In general, unmodeled library functions degrade precision of analysis. Consider code snippet shown in Listing 2. The code is borrowed from a Chromium (version 38) source file called page indicator.cc. The source file implements the PageIndicator object. The constructor of the PageIndicator object does not initialize all of its class members. For example, the member fade out timer id is lazily initialized in the method ResetFadeOutTimer() (Line 10). The same class member is read in a different method called OnTimerFired() (Line 15). An implicit assumption is that the lazy initialization happens early enough (at run time) for the read on Line 15 to be well-defined. If this assumption does not hold, an uninitialized read is going to take place during program execution. In fact, this is a documented bug in the Chromium issue tracker (see Appendix).
Program assumptions are particularly hard to tease out in object-oriented code. Modularity and reuse of code that OOP facilitates, push analysis of OO programs toward global analysis. Unfortunately, whole-program semantic analysis is not tractable [22] for large programs such as web browsers, OS kernels etc.
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Declaration Tainting
In practice, there are many scenarios in which memory access bugs manifest. As of mid April 2015, roughly 3% of bugs classified as security bugs in Chromium code are due to the use of uninitialized values 2 [1]. Clang SA employs compile-time symbolic execution for flagging defects. OO code-that conforms to meta program semantics embodied in design patterns-evades compile-time SE that only models semantics of a programming language. This motivates an alternative approach for analyzing object-oriented code.
We propose a taintedness abstraction and implement analysis infrastructure that it requires in the Clang SA core library. We have implemented primitives for our abstraction based on tainting of AST representation of C++ objects. The operational semantics (transfer functions) for our abstraction is problem specific. We describe these semantics for detecting uninitialized reads in § 5. Our implementation is independent of the program abstraction implemented natively in Clang SA.
Our approach has several benefits. First, by retrofitting simple declarationbased object tainting into Clang SA, we enable Checkers to perform analysis based on the proposed taint abstraction. Due to its general-purpose nature, the taint abstraction is useful for discovering multiple types of defects such as useafter-free, double-free etc. Second, the tainting APIs we expose are opt-in. They may be used by existing and/or new checkers. Third, our abstraction is patched into the Clang SA core library and may be used during path sensitive program analysis. Thus, our abstraction does not affect precision of analysis; in fact, it leverages high-precision analysis infrastructure that is already available in Clang SA. A fallout of declaration tainting is that checkers need to encode transfer functions for the taint abstraction. This shifts the onus of semantic program analysis from the Clang SA core library to the checker. We are in conflict with the division of labor envisaged in [21] , wherein, checkers are required to only encode the property to check. However, we see our proposal as a compromise. Declaration tainting is opt-in, so checkers can benefit from it, provided they undertake semantic analysis.
In Clang SA, analysis results are limited to the context in which the analysis takes place. In practice, inter context analysis is needed. Consider the general problem of correlating events in two different contexts: If a class member use does not have a reaching definition in an analysis context (Event A), and additionally, if the class member does not have a de-facto definition in the analysis context of the object's constructor function (Event B), it is a candidate for a memory access bug. For this reason, we develop a means to store analysis results for each top-level procedure declaration that is analyzed. We call this a procedure summary for the analyzed procedure. Next, we describe our design and implementation of procedure summaries.
Procedure Summaries
Procedure summary, in the context of Clang SA, is a data structure that stores analysis summary for a procedure. Procedure summaries are internal to Clang SA core library and are not exposed to Checkers. In their present form, summaries are used only for storing analysis meta-data, such as analysis coverage information. We extend Clang SA's procedure summaries implementation for encoding our abstraction's state. To facilitate declaration-based taint analysis, we add a set of taint maps to the procedure summary data structure. The taint map for a top-level procedure declaration (P T LD ) encapsulates taints on object declarations in the analysis context of that procedure. We expose APIs to Checkers for reading from, and/or, appending analysis state to procedure summaries. Taint information across procedures (P T LD s) can be examined once all procedures have been analyzed. This makes the implementation of our abstraction general-purpose, and context, and path sensitive.
The source-level analyzer in Mélange (a Checker) is implemented as a client module that makes use of our extensions to the Clang SA core library. Our hope is that other Checkers benefit from the added support and the proposed analysis abstraction 3 .
Uninitialized Class Member Finder
We prototype Mélange for finding potential uses of uninitialized C++ class members. Our prototype consists of UseDefChecker, the source-level analyzer, and
BugReportAnalyzer, an LLVM pass that performs whole-program analysis.
UseDefChecker
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode for source-level analysis carried out by the UseDefChecker. The UseDefChecker carries out program analysis in two phases. First, it leverages Clang SA for inter-procedural, context and path sensitive analysis (Lines 2 − 4 of Algorithm 1). For each top-level procedure declaration (tld i ), UseDefChecker keeps track of object definitions and object uses in the analysis context of tld i . Once analysis of all procedure declarations in a source file has been completed, UseDefChecker takes a translation-unit view of object uses and definitions (Line 5). A warning is emitted for uses that neither have a reaching definition nor are initialized in the constructor function. The present prototype tracks object uses and definitions for a small subset of operations in the C++ standard. These include the assignment operator, initializer list of a C++ constructor, the call statement, and a subset of binary and unary operators. The checker maintains two taint sets: context-sensitive taint set (T C ), and a procedure summary taint set (T P S ). The lifetime of context-sensitive taint set, T C , is limited to the analysis context of a procedure, P T LD : a top-level procedure declaration in a source file. On the other hand, the procedure summary taint set, T P S , is persistent until all procedures in a source file have been analyzed. We use two types of taint: use taint and def taint. When we encounter the first definition of a class member in an analysis context, we taint the class member's declaration object (Decl) with taint type def (Lines 19 − 20). Whenever an object is used in a C++ expression that we have registered for, we check if the object has a def taint (Lines 21 − 24). If there is a def taint, our analysis simply returns. If there is no def taint, we conclude that a reaching definition for the use does not exist in the present analysis context. In the latter case, we taint the used object with a use taint (Line 23). The use taint allows us to check for reaching definitions outside of the present analysis context. The use taint is recorded in the procedure summary for the analyzed top-level function declaration (T P S [T LD]). In addition, we store the program path in which the use happened, and the qualified name of the object member in checker-internal state. We call this candidate bug meta-data. Bug meta-data is used to populate candidate bug reports for uses that don't have a de-facto definition in the constructor.
Analysis of constructor bodies is different than analysis of method declarations. Class member definitions in the constructor's analysis context are def tainted. However, the def taint for member definitions/initializations in the constructor are stored in the constructor's procedure summary taint set (T P S [CT OR], Line 34). This allows us to check if uses of a class member in other procedures have de-facto definitions.
After procedures in a translation unit have been analyzed, the UseDefChecker matches use and def taints on C++ objects across analyzed procedures (see CheckUseDef). A bug report is emitted if a class member use does not have a de facto definition (Line 44). Once all source files in a codebase have been analyzed, and bug reports emitted, we perform IR-level analysis on the bug reports against a larger compilation unit. The next section describes the IR analysis of bug reports.
LLVM Pass: BugReportAnalyzer
IR-level analyzer in Mélange is engineered as an LLVM pass called BugReportAnalyzer pass. The opt binary that is part of LLVM utilities package is used to launch the analyzer pass. Since there is no standard means to pass external inputs to an LLVM pass, we use preprocessor directives written in a pass header file, to encode source-level bug meta-data. For each source-level bug report, the LLVM pass is rebuilt. We employ a wrapper script to automate both source-level and IR-level analysis, so little manual intervention is required. Algorithm 2 shows the pseudocode for BugReportAnalyzer pass. There are two inputs to the pass: source-level bug meta-data (inputs with Bug subscripts) and the LLVM bitcode library or executable where the bug localized (Module M). We rely on build system configuration to select a library/executable to perform IR analysis against.
Bug meta-data includes: (1) The program path in which the bug manifested; and (2) Qualified name of the C++ object that was used uninitialized (CM Bug ). The program path includes mangled names of the procedures that were inlined when the bug report was emitted. For simplicity, we only encode the names of the immediate procedure where the uninitialized read occurred (P 1 Bug ), and the outermost caller (top-level declaration), in whose analysis context the bug occurred (P 2 Bug ). We rely on named meta-data in LLVM IR for matching object and field names in the Clang SA bug report.
We begin analysis by obtaining a callgraph for the program under analysis (Line 2). We rely on an existing LLVM pass for this purpose. If there are no callers for the outermost procedure in whose analysis context a bug was reported (P 2 Bug ), we exit the analysis procedure flagging the source-level warning as a likely false positive (Lines 3−5). If a caller exists, we continue analysis. Next, we look for a load instruction in IR code corresponding to the source-level warning. We filter out source-level bug reports in which the flagged class member is not an operand of an IR load instruction (Lines 6 − 8). We qualify uninitialized reads via instructions other than the load instruction as potentially harmless.
Next, we taint those function call nodes in the program CG that either define (store to) or eventually invoke a function call that defines the class member pointed out by a source-level report (Procedure TaintStores). We do so, by iteratively searching for store instructions that define the class member across all procedures in the program. We maintain a tainted functions set (T F ) whose members are function calls that define the class member (Lines 14 − 18) . Subsequently, we recursively taint all callers of members of T F i.e., we add all function calls in the program that may define the class member to the set T F (Line 19). Finally, we traverse the program CG for extrapolating defects discovered during source-level analysis (see TraverseCG). Starting from the outermost procedure call in whose analysis context an uninitialized read was discovered (P 2 Bug ), we traverse the CG context and path insensitively (Lines 23 − 25), avoiding cycles during traversal. Our CG traversal algorithm either returns with a trivial callchain (P 2 Bug ) that we ignore, or a whole-program callchain in which the uninitialized read may happen. Chromium  3463  52  39  7  1  Firefox  587  56  39  2  3  MySQL  2494  52  38  2  7   Table 2 : Uninitialized Reads: Functional Metrics Our prototype has been evaluated against three large codebases that have a rigorous test cycle, namely: Chromium, Firefox, and MySQL-Server. Table  1 and Table 2 summarize our findings. We discuss the quality of the extended bug reports in § 6.1. Owing to its process-level parallelism, source-level analysis scales linearly with increased availability of computational power. IR-level analysis is singlethreaded. This is a bottleneck for analyzing programs in excess of a few hundred MB in size. Firefox's libxul library, the largest program analyzed at 1.1 GB in size, consumes over 12 GB of RAM for each analysis instance. On the other hand, relatively small Chromium libraries are fast to analyze. Despite the suboptimal nature of IR analysis, the average time required to analyze a single bug report is modest even for large programs.
Evaluation
Our prototype has found two real bugs: an uninitialized read of a C++ class member in Chromium's pdf and blink sub-systems. Bugs flagged by our prototype in Firefox and MySQL codebases have been reported to the vendor and #include "pdf/page_indicator.h" 6 7 #include "base/logging.h" 8 #include "base/strings/string_util.h" 9 #include "pdf/draw_utils.h" 10 #include "pdf/number_image_generator.h" 11 #include "pdf/resource_consts.h" 12 13 namespace chrome_pdf { 14 15 16 PageIndicator::PageIndicator() 17 : current_page_(0), Figure 3 shows Mélange's bug report for an uninitialized read in the pdf library shipped with Chromium v38. The source-level bug report shows the line of code that was buggy. IR analyzer's bug report shows candidate callchains in the libpdf library in which the uninitialized read may manifest. Our whole-program bug report is close to MSan's stack trace in the original bug report.
For functional evaluation of Mélange, we use test suites from NIST's SA-MATE project [30] . Test cases for CWE457 (Use of uninitialized variable/object) have been used. Table 3 summarizes analysis results. While our false positive rate is good (1 in 5), we miss roughly three out of five real bugs because our prototype tracks uses and definitions for a small subset of operations in the C++ standard. This is not a fundamental limitation of our framework. We intend to add support for more C++ operations. Our IR analysis is path and context insensitive. Unlike KLEE, we do not perform whole-program symbolic execution for finding bugs because symbolic execution is not known to scale to even medium-sized programs [22] , let alone large programs like Chromium, and MySQL. Still, to counter imprecision, we can augment our IR analyzer with additional analyses. Specifically, precise alias analysis and virtual call resolution will help prune false positives. In our prototype, virtual method invocations act as analysis barriers because we cannot traverse the program callgraph beyond a dynamically dispatched function call. Thus, reaching definitions on the other side of this analysis barrier are missed. One approach to counter imprecision is to employ a ranking mechanism for bug reports (e.g., Z-Ranking [26] ). Finally, we encounter an identical set of false positives in the Unicode library included in both Firefox, and Chromium codebases. These false reports are caused by exposed library APIs that read class members. We encounter false reports in the MySQL codebase due to seemingly redundant code. In our present prototype, we don't have a means to suppress analysis of exposed APIs and/or dead code.
Related Work
Lint was developed at Bell Labs in 1977, primarily to check "portability, style, and efficiency" of C programs [25] . Lint performed syntactic analysis, predom-inantly type-checking, of programs for flagging potential programming errors. In the past two decades, many commercial [3, 20, 7, 24] , closed-source [17] , and open source/free [2, 6, 33, 10, 14, 23, 18, 34, 15, 13, 35] [29, 33, 10, 15] , or hybrid systems such as [13] . In the following paragraphs, we comment on related work that is close in spirit to Mélange.
Program Instrumentation Traditionally, memory access bugs have been found by performing randomized program testing (e.g., fuzzing) of instrumented program binaries. The instrumentation takes care of tracking the state of program memory and adds run-time checks before memory accesses are made. Instrumentation is done either during run time (as in Valgrind [29] ), or at compile time (as in AddressSanitizer [33] ). Since compile-time instrumentation has a lower run time overhead, the idea has gained traction, and compile-time program instrumentation is now being used to find multiple kinds of memory access errors including reads from uninitialized memory [10] . As effective as tools such as Valgrind, and ASan are, they fail to provide an assurance on the program as a whole. To the best of our knowledge, we are unaware of published work that evaluates code coverage of fuzzer-based tools against large codebases. In contrast, a static analysis tool such as ours, performs more comprehensive code analysis, complementing software testing.
Symbolic Execution Symbolic execution has been used to find bugs in programs, or to generate test cases with improved code coverage. KLEE [15] , Clang SA [2] , and AEG [13] use different flavors of forward symbolic execution for their own end. In KLEE and AEG, FSE is performed at run-time. As the program (symbolically) executes, constraints on program paths (path predicates) are maintained. Satisfiability queries on path predicates are used to prune infeasible program paths. AEG proposes heuristics to reduce input space of symbolic inputs using a technique the authors call "preconditioned symbolic execution." Unlike KLEE and AEG, symbolic execution in Clang SA is done statically. Moreover, the extent of symbolic execution in Clang SA is limited to a single source file, unlike KLEE and AEG that symbolically execute wholeprograms. Anecdotal evidence suggests that KLEE and AEG don't scale up to large programs like web browsers [22] . Mélange is a step towards reconciling analysis scalability with analysis effectiveness for large programs.
Static Analysis Parfait [17] employs an analysis strategy that is similar in spirit to ours for finding buffer overflows in C programs. It employs multiple stages of analysis. In Parfait, each successive stage is more precise than the preceding stage. Parfait uses IR-only analysis in contrast to mixed-level (Source + IR) analysis that we undertake. We want source-level patterns that typically characterize bug classes (e.g., uninitialized read, use-after-free) to be driving analysis. This precludes IR-only analysis. Like Yamaguchi et al. [35] , our goal is empower developers in finding multiple instances of a known defect. However, the approach we take is different. In [35] , structural traits in a program's AST representation are used to drive a Machine Learning (ML) phase. The ML phase extrapolates traits of known vulnerabilities in a codebase, obtaining matches that are similar in structure to the vulnerability. In contrast, Mélange employs semantic analysis to drive defect discovery, while leveraging an LLVM pass towards defect extrapolation. Our notion of defect extrapolation is different: For us, extrapolation entails obtaining whole-program diagnostics for a local defect.
CQUAL [18] , and CQual++ [34] , are flow-insensitive data-flow analysis frameworks for C and C++ languages respectively. Oink performs whole-program data-flow analysis on the back of Elsa, a C++ parser, and Cqual++. Data-flow analysis is based on type qualifiers. Our approach has two advantages over Cqual++. We use a production compiler for parsing C++ code that has a much better success rate at parsing advanced C++ code than a custom parser such as Elsa. Second, our source-level analysis is both flow and path sensitive while, in CQual++, it is not. Livshits et al. [28] , propose a program analysis technique to detect security vulnerabilities in Java code. Their technique relies on contextsensitive points-to analysis of Java objects. Java bytecode is analyzed against a user-specified vulnerability specification written in a declarative language. The approach is similar in spirit to Fortify's taint analyzer [8] that performs analysis of IR-level objective C code using user-written tainting rules. Both these works are geared towards IDE integration. In contrast, Mélange encodes a hard-coded taint policy in its source-level analyzer. However, our taint infrastructure can be leveraged for use with user-specified taint policy as in [28, 8] .
Finally, Clang Static Analyzer borrows ideas from several publications including (but not limited to) [31, 21] . Inter-procedural context-sensitive analysis in Clang SA is based on graph reachability that was proposed by Reps et al. [31] . Clang SA is similar in spirit to xgcc [21] .
